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Abstract Regulation of fisheries production together with public promotion of
fisheries products offer a potentially profitable environment for fishermen. Yet
production restrictions are usually insufficient to prevent entry, causing de-
pletion of the resource base and dissipation of long-run profits from promo-
tion. Shorter run gains may be possible, providing producer response to ad-
vertising is not instantaneous.
Lagged biological and economic responses appear to provide a rationale
for pulsed advertising. Moreover, a pulsed advertising policy is shown to mit-
igate the adverse effects on the resource base which would normally accom-
pany expansion of consumption without direct production control.
Keywords Generic promotion, oysters, common property, pulsed advertis-
ing.
Introduction
Almost ninety percent of U.S. fishery production comes from capture fisheries
(USDA). These capture fisheries are managed under the jurisdiction of either the
federal government or individual states, depending on whether or not the majority
of the harvest is within three miles of a state's coastline. The political economy of
fisheries management at both the state and federal level has resulted in an industry
structure, in most cases, based on free entry. Entry restrictions proposed by
economists to protect both the resource and its potential economic rents have
been discarded in favor of a morass of protective regulations which conserve the
stock but restrict neither entry nor expansion.'
Other programs related to the fishing industry, at both the federal and state
level, are often treated separately from the fisheries management and stock con-
servation efforts. For example, in Maryland, the Office of Seafood Marketing is
currently in the Maryland Department of Agriculture, while regulation of fish
harvesting is under the jurisdiction of the Maryland Department of Natural Re-
sources. At the Federal level, there is little coordination within the National
Marine Fisheries Service between the division responsible for fisheries manage-
' A notable exception is the surf clam fishery which has had a moratorium on entry of new
vessels since 1977. There have also been severe restrictions on the number of hours a surf
clam vessel may fish over the course of the season. A landings rights program is currently
being implemented.
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ment (including the largely autonomous Regional Fishery Management Councils)
and those involved with industry development. Therefore, it is not surprising that
Federal and state programs aimed at generic promotion of seafood products have
shown little consideration for the problems associated with the open access ex-
ploitation of a common property resource.
The most recent example of this was the passage of the Fish and Seafood
Promotion Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-659). The Act provides Federal funds for generic
promotion of seafood through 1990, but more importantly, provides the enabling
legislation to allow the seafood industry to assess its members on a continuing
basis for the cost of generic advertising. The legislation also allows the industry to
set quality standards in a similar manner to other agricultural marketing orders.
Interestingly, in the Section 202, Findings, of the Act, it is mentioned that:
"(6) many fish species are underutilized by the United States fishing industry
because of underdeveloped markets."
There is no mention in the findings that the major problem facing the U.S. fishing
industry continues to be the depressed conditions of many stocks due to over-
harvest, and the overcapitalization in most segments of the fishing industry.
The issues related to the social desirability of advertising of branded products
and generic products have been discussed in the economics literature (e.g.,
Scherer, 1980; Nichols, 1985). On the producer side, it is clear that long-term
gains to advertising are dissipated by new entry and expansion of output. There-
fore, advertising is most beneficial to producers when there is some restriction on
flow-to-market. These restrictions may be due to monopoly power for branded
products, and may be facilitated by agricultural marketing orders for generic
products. With an open-access fishery, short-term gains from higher prices due to
generic advertising are dissipated by a combination of an expansion in output and
higher costs of production due to a further depletion of the stock in order to
expand output. If the fish stock is biologically overharvested, expanded fishing
effort may actually lower the harvest in the long-run, but the price rise caused by
lower production will still be offset by higher fishing costs. Fishing effort regula-
tions adopted to capture the economic rent of the fishery resource could also have
the effect of preserving long-term gains from generic advertising of fishery prod-
ucts.
Whether or not consumers are better off due to advertising will depend on the
content of the advertising, information or deception, and on whether or not wel-
fare is measured using ex ante or ex post advertising tastes (Dixit and Norman;
Scherer, 1980 pp. 376^05). However, in common-property fisheries, the likeli-
hood of consumer losses due to advertising is greater because of the possibility of
biological overharvest. Even when the advertising is pure information, the result-
ing demand shift may result in higher prices and less production. McConnell and
Strand (1989) demonstrate this effect when a shift in demand due to improved
water quality, analogous to an increase in advertising, results in decreased con-
sumer surplus.
In this paper we develop the framework for determining the optimal promo-
tional strategy for fisheries conditional on the omnipresent free entry management
regime, aware that such strategies may diverge considerably from the solutions
which restrict production and fishing effort. Optimization is based solely on pro-
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or indirectly supported by the government should have consumer benefits mea-
sured as well. We have chosen to ignore these because of the controversy dis-
cussed earlier about how they should be measured, and also to reflect the reality
that these programs, although sometimes explicitly stated otherwise, are not de-
signed with the consumer's welfare in mind. The Fish and Seafood Promotion Act
establishes a National Fish and Seafood Promotion Council where 14 of the 15
voting members represent the producing industry and the 15th member shall be:
"(F) one member-at-large who is either a person professionally engaged in the
dissemination of information pertaining to the nutritional benefits and prepa-
ration of fish and fish products or a person who is a member of an organized
labor union and has expertise in the United States fisheries."
This member is the nearest to a "consumer" representative on the Council.
A conceptual model of generic advertising with a common property resource
base is developed, accounting for the dynamics of advertising and demand, capital
formation in the fishing industry, and the fish stock. First-order conditions arising
from optimal advertising strategies are used to examine the economic trade-offs
between higher immediate industry profits versus eventual unwanted capital. The
likely time delays in the system suggest a potential solution of cyclical advertising
expenditures. Depending on the behavior of the cycle, pulsing of advertising over
a period of substantial duration may be observed.
Data from the Maryland oyster industry was used to apply and test the con-
ceptual model. Recent events, principally the decimation of Maryland's oyster
stocks due to disease, would confound the results and are not included in the
analysis. Relevant biological and economic parameters of the Maryland industry
are estimated econometrically. and these results are applied to a numerical anal-
ysis of optimal intertemporal advertising strategies.
Empirical results suggest that under the conditions of the Maryland oyster
fishery from 1967-1980, constant levels of advertising are suboptimal in raising
fisherman's incomes. Instead, a cyclical pattern (or pulsed strategy) will be opti-
mal. This pulse strategy does not arise from "wearout" (Simon, 1992) or linearity
(Clark, 1976) phenomena, but rather from initial conditions and the trade-off
between capital necessary for profit and capital that ultimately reduces the fish
stock. Advertising is only undertaken when fishing effort is relatively low and the
resource base built up. When potential production is high, advertising is intro-
duced. The resultant high incomes attract effort and drive down the fish stock,
making continued high levels of advertising counterproductive. Reducing adver-
tising leads to exit and subsequent resource recovery. The cycle dampens after
several reversals.
Optimal Advertising in a Common Property Fishery
We extend the previous work of Nerlove and Arrow (1962) and of Schmalensee
(1972) by addressing the nature of optimal advertising strategies in industries
harvesting a common property resource. Recognizing the intrinsic dynamic nature
of advertising, these authors argue that advertising is a form of investment affect-
ing both current and future demand for a product. Combining this aspect of
advertising with the biological stock growth and capital accumulation on the sup-
ply side causes complex dynamic strategies.192 Bockstael, Strand, and Upton
Demand is considered lo be a function of consumers' perception of the product
where this perception is reflected in their stock of goodwill for the product. The
stock of goodwill is augmented by advertising but decays over time. Thus good-
will at time t equals;
,). (1)
The parameter 8 reflects the carryover of goodwill from one period to the next (0
=e 5 =£ 1), and g() relates advertising expenditures to goodwill. Since it is reason-
able to expect diminishing returns to advertising. ag/aA > 0 and d^%/dA~ < 0 are
assumed. The stock of goodwill in any time period (G) and exogenous factors (Z)
affect the price consumers are willing to pay for (Q) of the product. Thus, the
inverse demand function can be expressed as:
P, = D(Q,.G^,Z,). (2)
Following an approach frequently employed in fisheries biology and econom-
ics {e.g., Bell, 1972), but more generally applicable, we present all inputs used in
production by one index which we call effort (E).^ Thus, effort measures both
capital and its utilization. The degree of utilization of capital in a given time period
will likely depend on current price (P,). The availability of capital in that time
period with depend on the capital stock, built as a function of expected future
returns. A naive expectations approacb is used to model the determination of
desired capital stock levels. Previous periods prices (P,_i) and resource stock
levels {X,_i) are used in the capital formation decision to yield a total effort
response equation of the following general form.^
E, = k(P,.Ei_,.X,_,.P,_,) (3)
where the common property situation implies no central control over effort levels.
The supply of product at time t is determined by effort and the size of the resource
stocks:
Q, = h(E,.X,). • (4)
Stock sizes changes with natural growth, f(X), and with harvests, so that the
resource stock in time t can be expressed as:
X. = f(Xt^,) - Q(_,. (5)
^ Squires discusses the restrictive nature of using E as an index of production inputs, but
its use here greatly decreases data requirements and allows us to proceed with an analysis
of generic promotion.
^ As an anonymous reviewer pointed it. this specification does not depend directly on
profits, and therefore, does not guarantee a steady state equilibrium with zero profits as
would be predicted by theory. Due to lack of cost data it is not possible to calculate profits
from the data set. As a next best approach, we use this specification as a proxy for
behavioral response to profits. When prices and stock are such that profits would be
positive effort enters, but lower prices and stocks leading to negative profits result in exit
of effort.Pulsed Generic Advertising 193
The function f(X) is assumed to be concave and increasing over an open interval
(O,X) where X is the size of the equilibrium unfished population.
The central authority is assumed to exercise effective control over only one
decision variable, advertising expenditures (A). This is consistent with the exist-
ing seafood promotion act and the realities of separation of seafood promotion
activities from resource management programs at both the state and federal level.
The objective is to maximize the present value of the stream of net returns to
harvesting minus agency advertising costs, where for any period t the objective
function is:''
P,(QpG,,Z,) • Q,(E,,X,) - C(E,) - A^. (6)
Costs of production are represented by C(Ei) and are increasing in effort. Since
advertising is measured in terms of real expenditures. A, equals the cost of ad-
vertising as well.
The authority's decision problem can be characterized in a discrete-time op-
timal-control framework (Burt and Cummings, 1970). It can be expressed as a
LaGrangian maximization of the form:
T
L = max 2 lPt(Qt,G,,Zt) • Q,(Et,X,) - C(E,) -
t=o
-f- Q,-,) - M.,PHE, (,t,,,i,|)
i))] (7)
where p = 1/(1 + p), and p is the real discount rate.
The multipliers, k, \i., and 7 are, respectively, the implicit current values of a
marginal unit of resource stock, capital stock and goodwill. Maximization of L
with respect to Aj for all t yields the following set of first-order conditions for
optimization:
(CD
* We assume capital is perfectly malleable, and therefore, need only be concerned with the
operating cost of effort and not the rental cost of capital and depreciation (Clark et al.,
1979). Later in the empirical analysis we will argue that there is a delayed response in
capital accumulation or removal. Most fishermen, particularly Maryland watermen, are
adaptable to switching fishing effort to other fisheries because of the large natural variation
in fish stocks. These alternatives allow malleability, but behaviorally. the watermen are
modeled as adjusting partially.
^ We suppress the initial and terminal condition constraints to improve readability. How-
ever, the application implicitly takes them into consideration.194 Bockstaei, Strand, and Lipton
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for all t, in addition to the three constraints (1), (3) and (5) and a non-negative
constraint on At for all t.
With one control and three state variables, simplification of the above condi-
tions is difficult, but their interpretation is relatively easy. Conditions (CD and
(C2) together describe the optimal path for advertising and goodwill, conditional
on the scarcity values of effort and resource stocks. Condition (CD has the in-
terpretation that in any time period the marginal cost of advertising (which equals
one, since advertising is measured in expenditures) should equal the present value
in that time period of all future net benefits generated by the increment in adver-
tising. These net benefits accrue through the effect of advertising on goodwill in
the next time period.
Condition (C2), the expression for the marginal scarcity value of goodwill,
provides information as to the components of these net benefits. The first term
captures the direct effect on revenues in the current period of increasing goodwill
and thus shifts out demand. The second term captures the scarcity value of that
portion of goodwill which is carried over to the next period, where 8 is the
proportion of goodwill carried forward. The final terms reflect the marginal scar-
city value of present and all future effort attracted to the fishery by the current
increase in price generated by the increment in goodwill. These terms are unique
to the common property setting and represent an unusual cost of advertising.
Increasing advertising provides economic incentives for entry of new effort,
where effort is likely already to be employed at inefficiently high levels. This
common property effect is translated into expected negative values for |x, the
scarcity value of effort. i
Condition (C3) provides an expression for the scarcity value of effort. The
term 1/[1 - (dE/aP,)(aP,/aQ,)(aQ,/aE,)] is present only because of the concurrent
effect of effort on price and price on effort. This term is less than one and serves
to dampen the magnitude of the remainder of the expression since a round of
increased effort depresses price through increased harvests and so leads to a
simultaneous reduction in effort. The term approaches one in the short run when
adjustments of effort by producers are more difficult.
The sign of the marginal scarcity value of effort can be determined by assess-
ing the three terms in the numerator of equation (C3). The first term represents
marginal net revenues from increasing effort. In a competitive industry this shouldPulsed Generic Advertising 195
be negative because excessive effort is dissipating the potential economic rent of
the resource stock. The second term reflects the scarcity value of the effort
carried over to the next period. The third term captures the marginal user cost
associated with the resource stock, adversely affected by increased effort. Em-
bodied in this term are the stock externalities which are not taken into account by
individual producers in a common property fishery. The marginal value of stock
is derived in condition (C4).
The important dynamic features of conditions (C2-C4) are highlighted when
they are written in the general form:
Y, = v-'Y,,. m
where Y, is the 3 x 1 vector of LaGrangian multipliers in our problem, and V is
a 3 X 3 matrix reflecting intertemporal movements in Yi. The solution for Yt can
be characterized as:
Y, = BD^B-'Y, (9) ^
where Dj, is a diagonal matrix (3 x 3) of the characteristic roots (»|J) of V, and B
is a matrix (3 x 3) whose columns are the characteristic vectors of A (Chow,
1975). If some characteristic roots are complex numbers (i.e., il»i = a; ± bi v-I),
then their contribution to the solution can be represented as a harmonic function
of the form sr' cos(9 + wt) where sr' represents the amplitude; B/co. the phase shift;
and a)/27r, the frequency. If |r| < 1, then the solution is a dampened cycle.
A Statistical Model of the Maryland Oyster Industry
Until its recent decimation by disease, the Maryland oyster fishery was the most
important economic component of the Maryland seafood industry. Regulated to
conserve stock through inefficient means (Christy, 1964), the industry uses the
same technologies as in the l880's. A campaign to promote the Maryland oyster
was instituted in 1967 on the heels of a major effort to rebuild the overharvested
oyster stock through public replenishment of oyster stocks. Although not entirely
directed towards oysters, Maryland's Seafood Development Program spent $1.5
million between 1967 and 1980 to assist the oyster industry in marketing its in-
creased production. Program funds, however, were cut by 50% in 1981 to
$115,000. Funds continued to diminish throughout the remainder of the 198O's
until 1989 when a major enhancement brought funds back to the 1981 levels.
However, the period of 1967-1980 offers a perfect situation in which to test the
operational value of our conceptual model.
Estimates of the biological and economic parameters of the theoretical struc-
ture must be obtained prior to calculating a solution to the dynamic optimization
problem: In order to make these parameter estimates from available data, it is
necessary to provide specificity and functional form to the general equations of
the previous section.
Changes in the resource stock variable are captured by a typical discrete
approximation (Hilborn, 1979):
t_, - (r/k)Xf_i - Q,_, (10)196 Bockstael, Strand, and Lipton
where r is a biological growth parameter, and k is the equilibrium of the unfished
population.*^ We assume a production relationship of the form:
Q, = qE,X^ (II)
where the parameter q reflects the proportion of the stock harvested by a unit of
effort. Since there are no measures of the standing stock of oysters over the time
period of interest, equations (10) and (11) are combined to yield the estimating
equation:
Rt = (I + r)R,., - (r/qkXR^i) " qQt-t + n^ (12)
where R, = Q,/E, represents relative stock abundance and n^ is a random distur-
bance term.^
The second equation in the system describes the determination of the level of
fishermen's inputs, E. Fishermen are expected to alter their capital utilization in
response to current prices and to alter their capital stock in response to expecta-
tions of returns based on past prices and yields (reflected in relative abundance).
These expected returns affect their desired effort level, which is given by:
E* = ^, + B,P, + B^P,., + P3R,_, + vj. (13)
Fishermen typically do not completely and immediately adjust effort to desired
levels. The change in effort can be described by the partial adjustment model.^
E, - E,_, = <1>(E,* - E,_i) -h Wp • (14)
Combining (13) and (14):
+ (bS-iRi-i + s, (i^
where the error terms s, meets the Gauss-Markov assumptions if Vt and w, do.
The third transition equation cannot be estimated directly because goodwill is
unobservable. However, from equation (1), G, can be expressed in terms of past
advertising levels as:
* As a reviewer has pointed out. this is not the best discrete time approximation of the
logistic growth function. It is however, an approximation of an appropriate growth function
and can easily be estimated with linear regression techniques.
' As pointed out by a reviewer, this specification introduces the potential for bias into the
estimation if, as hypothesized, E, and E,., are related. Unfortunately, there is no way
around this problem because there is no independent estimate of stock size available.
Alternative behavioral assumptions {e.g., rational expectations) could be proposed for
the watermen's behavior. Institutional constraints limit watermen's ability to borrow so
that investment must generally come from recent years' profits. Additionally, the inflexible
nature of human capital in fishing precludes rapid disinvestment. These arguments make a
short-term lagged adjustment model far more realistic that a rational expectations model for
fishing firms.Pulsed Generic Advertising 197
i-i). (16)
i=0
Making a substitution for goodwill in a linear demand function allows us to ex-
press demand as:
Qi = tto +
i-O
+ Ut (17)
where Z, represents other exogenous variables. Estimation of this equation re-
quires a Koyck transformation which yields:
- B) -^ 6Qt_, + a,(P, - hP,_^)
- 8Z,_i) + m,. (18)
An iterative procedure was used to estimate a value for 5 which would be con-
sistent throughout the equation. Note that m, equals jx, - 5|x, _, and is first order
serially correlated if the ^t, of (17) are independent.
Equations (12), (15), and (18) yield a system which is compatible with the
theoretical model and can be estimated using available data. Published annual
data on harvest, value of harvest and total boat days for Maryland oysters were
available for the 1965 through 1976 seasons (Cabraal. 1978). Unpublished data on
harvest, value of harvest, and boat days by gear type were made available from
Maryland's Department of Natural Resources for the 1975 through 1981 seasons.
State expenditures on seafood marketing since 1968 were available, although
funds targeted specifically for oysters could not be determined. Since oysters
constituted the major focus of this marketing program, total expenditures repre-
sented a good approximation.
In addition to the variables discussed above, two other factors were consid-
ered. First, evidence suggests that demand in the 1976 and 1977 oyster seasons
was affected by publicity on the closure of the James River due to kepone con-
tamination (Swartz and Strand, 1981). A binary variable is included in the price
equation to capture this effect. A second institutional factor is taken into account
in the effort equation. In addition to season and gear restrictions, effort on oyster
stocks was regulated for many years by county residency requirements (Powers,
1970). These requirements, however, were struck down in late 1971 (Bruce vs.
Director, Department of Chesapeake Bay Affairs), with a resulting increase in
mobility (Lewis and Strand, 1978).
The defmition and measurement of the preceding data is summarized as fol-
lows:
R, relative abundance of oysters or catch per unit effort in season t, mea-
sured in bushels per tong day, mean = 18.7;
Et effort in season t measured in millions of tong boat days per season,
mean = .122;198 Bockstael, Strand, and Lipton
Q, harvest in season t measured in millions of bushels, mean = 2.27;
Pt average price in season t measured in 1967 dollars per bushel, mean =
$3.69 per bushel;
At_ I Maryland Seafood Marketing Division expenses in the fiscal year prior
to the fishing season, measured in millions of 1967 dollars, mean =
$.104;
Zt binary variable for James River closure, value is one for I975-I976 and
1976-1977 season, zero otherwise;
D, binary variable identifying the years in which county residency require-
ments were in effect, one for each season through 1970-1971, zero for
post I970-197I seasons;
DPt the difference between Pj and 8P, _ j;
DZ, the difference between Zt and 5Zt_i.
The results of the three-stage least-squares estimation of the system are pre-
sented in Table I.** Most coefficients have expected signs and are at least twice the
magnitude of their standard errors. The exceptions are in the effort equation
where the coefficients on contemporaneous price and lagged relative abundance
are less than twice their respective standard errors. The insignificance of the
current price coefflcient is not surprising since the largest variations in effort
would be brought about by changes in the capital stock, requiring at least one year
to accomplish. Variations in the utilization of existing capital stock are more likely
to be affected by random events (e.g.. weather) than by short-run responses to
price. Once having rigged their boats and thus having made a commitment to
oystering, watermen do not have many comparable employment alternatives dur-
ing the oyster season. The insignificance of relative abundance suggests that the
effect of stock levels on effort decisions is also negligible. This seems realistic
since the common property nature of the flshery introduces considerable uncer-
tainty into the relationship between present stocks and future yields to any indi-
vidual flsherman. The effort equation also supports the argument that flshermen
do not respond immediately to changes in economic incentives. A little more than
' Because the observation set approach is undersized (Theil. 1971, p. 532), parameters in
the nonlinear function g(A,_ ,) could not be estimated simultaneously with the parameters
of the rest of the system. Instead, we chose several different functional forms for g(Ai_ ,),
all of which were consistent with the a priori requirements that dg/dA > 0 and a V^A^ < o!
\ye proceeded to test the robustness of the other system coefficients over choice of func-
tional form and ranges of non-linear parameters. The three functional forms chosen for g( )
wered - exp(vA,_,)), the semi-log form (A7_ ,), and the logistic (1/(1 -I- exp A)). Param-
eters ranged from -4 to -1.2 for v and -.2 to -.95 for -y. In no case did the re-
specification alter substantially any coefficients other than the coefficient on g(A,_,) in
equation (18). Changes in the specification of g(A,_,) within our set of alternative func-
tional forms merely amounted to changes in the scaling of unobservable goodwill and did
not alter the rest of the system. We then tested the etTect of re-specification of the optimal
solution. Although there were slight deviations from the time paths described below, the
nature of the solutions remained the same. As more data become available, a more accurate
specification of g(A, _ ,) will be possible through maximum likelihood estimation. However,
we are confident that the choice of functional form for g( A, _,) did not substantially affect
our results. The necessity of obtaining biological estimates precluded using an approach
similar to the one used by Rausser and Hochman (1979) in their analysis of the orange
industry. Our formulation is also easily adapted to explore socially efficient advertising
levels since demand parameters are directly obtained.Pulsed Generic Advertising 199
half the desired change in effort (cf) = .57) is accomplished by the end of the first
year.
From the resource stock equation, we derive estimates of the biological pa-
rameters discussed above. The catchability coefficient (q) is estimated at 4.87 for
a million tong days. At effort levels of around 100,000 boat days, an estimated 49%
of the fish populations is being harvested annually. The oyster growth coefficient
(r) is 1.42; this parameter is key to providing stability to the population growth
equation. In the case where 1 < r ^ 2, the unexploited population follows a
damped oscillation around k (Conrad and Clark, 1987). The estimated size of the
unfished population (k) is about 9 million bushels.'"
Finally, from the demand equation we can derive estimates of consumers'
response to price and advertising levels as well as the amount of carryover in
goodwill (8). The derived value of the carryover parameter is .23. which suggests
that most of the goodwill generated by advertising is dissipated by the second
year. The short-run price elasticity of demand is calculated as -0.92 at the mean,
which agrees favorably with a recent study by Cheng and Capps, 1988 which
yielded an elasticity of - 1.13.
Optimal Advertising of a Common Property Resource:
The Maryland Oyster
Before presenting the optimal advertising strategies and their implications, a brief
review of the time paths generated by open-access fishing is useful. Movements to
a new competitive equilibrium following exogenous disturbances in a common
property fishery are thought to be cyclical (Christy. 1964). For example, following
a shock which raises prices, effort will increase and result in increased harvests.
The increased harvests have two effects on the system: it tends to depress price;
and it drives down the resource stocks, eventually reducing yield. This leads to
reduced effort, reduced harvests, and resulting higher prices and yields. The
cyclical effect is enhanced by the lags in both behavioral and biological response.
As we have empirically estimated above, effort does not respond immediately to
changes in economic signals. Because major changes in fishing effort levels re-
quire investment or disinvestment, effort responds gradually to economic incen-
tives. Additionally, fish stocks make take several years to fully respond to
changes in effort as stocks are overfished or being rebuilt.
We consider the objective of maximizing producer returns to the State of
Maryland's seafood promotion effort and use the conceptual model, together with
the empirical results, to establish optimal strategies for oyster advertising. A
secondary objective of the State's promotion were returns to the State's $.35-per-
bushel tax to buyers. Thus the discounted net promotion benefits in period t are
given by:
NB, = p'(Q,(P, + .35) - C(E,) - A,) (19)
'" This is substantially less than the fifteen million bushels or more that were taken in the
late l800"s. Some of the difference can be rationalized by the loss in habitat in the upper
Bay caused by siltation of once-productive oyster bends and by substantial lowering of
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where Q, and P, are derived from the estimated equations as:
Q, = 4.87EtXt (20)
P, = 7.26 - 8.52EtX, + 4.16G,. (21)
Operating costs C(Et) are estimated based on Smith at a constant cost of $77 per
boat day (in 1967 dollars). A real interest rate of 7 percent was chosen for the
calculations." Net benefits are measured in 1967 dollars.
The intertemporai optimization problem then is:
128
Max L* = 2 3'tNB, + \,(X, + .58 - 2.42X,_i + .17X?_i - 4.87EtXt)
1=0
+ 7t(G, - .23G,_, -(I -e-«A-')
-I- M..(E[ - .003 - .43E,_, - 0.18P,_i) -^ <i>.(A, - .5)]
- 3.26) +7o(Go) + MEo - .128). (22)
The initial conditions are obtained from actual 1967 data. Terminal-value func-
tions are not included because the 128-year time horizon precludes concern over
terminal values. In addition, reducing the time horizon from 128 to 64 years
caused no effect on the optimal time path for the first 20 years. We assume
managers will not "disadvertise" and will be constrained by a maximum adver-
tising budget of $500,000, twice the size of their largest previous level of adver-
tising. Numerical solutions were obtained on a Univac 1180 using the DUAL
non-linear optimization program (Electrical Engineering Department, University
of California at Berkeley).
The optimal time path is illustrated for the first 20 years in Figure 1, and the
actual values are presented in Table 2. Advertising expenditures cycle twice be-
fore converging to about $200,000 per year. An optimal strategy was consistent
with postponing advertising until 1970, and then advertising heavily for four years,
followed by three years of low expenditures and then a fairly long period of
moderate advertising. The solution contrasts with actual State expenditures which
began in 1967 at $100,000, reached a peak in 1975, and have fallen steadily since
then.
The value of the objective function with actual and optimal advertising is also
presented in Table 2. Optimal advertising increased the net present value of pro-
ducer and State returns to advertising by almost $1.1 million dollars over the 14
year period for which there was actual data on State expenditures.
The nature of the solution prescribed for this problem is a pulsed form of
advertising. From a mathematical perspective, this implies that the solution to
conditions (C1)-(C4) has imaginary characteristics roots causing the cyclical pat-
" This rate approximates the rate suggested by the Water Resource Council guidelines in
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Figure I. Optimal levels of advertising with corresponding levels of stock and effort.
tern. From a heuristic perspective, the nature of the solution follows from the fact
that (1) advertising is most worthwhile when landings are large and price is de-
pressed, and (2) advertising has the indirect effect of attracting capital. To move
from the initial state to the optimal steady state, the model first allows stocks to
build, causing production to rise, prices to fall, and effort to exit the industry. By
not advertising in the first few periods, effort is reduced from 130,000 boat days
to 112,000, while stock is rising to over four million bushels. Advertising is pulsed
just before the natural growth in stock reaches its peak of 3.25 million bushels per
year (at a standing stock level of about 4.13 million bushels). At this point, harvest
can be large without dramatic depletion of the resource. Net revenues climb as
price remains high and catch per boat day increases. Eventually, as stocks fall
(see Figure I) advertising is relaxed causing effort to exit the industry and stocks
to rebuild. The optimal path prescribes a second pulse in advertising just prior to
the second peak in natural growth, again creating positive net revenues.
Solution of the control model generates shadow prices for the three stock
variables (see Table 2). It is interesting to note that the shadow value for effort is
negative throughout, indicating that the industry remains overcapitalized. Since
the objective function includes only producer welfare and State tax revenues, the
negative shadow value implies overcapitalization in the sense that excessive effort
erodes the present value of industry net returns, not necessarily net social returns.
The initial low scarcity value for good will resulting initially in no advertisingPulsed Generic Advertising 203
Table 2














































































































reflects an imbalance between resource stock and effort. In this situation, good-
will does more harm in attracting unwanted effort than it helps by raising price.
During the first few periods as stocks grow and effort declines, the scarcity value
of goodwill increases, eventually promoting non-zero optimal levels of advertis-
ing.
Sensitivity Analysis
The optimal control solution suggests the desirability of cyclical advertising over
the initial periods. Three factors appear critical in determining the degree and
timing of the cycle: the negative scarcity value of capital, the long-term effective-
ness of advertising, and the growth rate of the resource stock. Particulariy im-
portant with respect to the negative scarcity value of capital is the speed of
adjustment of capital ((j) of equation (15)). In addition, the long-term effectiveness
of advertising is primarily dependent on the carryover of goodwill (5 in equation
(18)). Einally, the growth rate parameter (r in equation (12)) signals the respon-
siveness of the resource to changing harvest levels.
Eigure 2 depicts the optimal time paths of advertising with various deviations
in key parameters. Eirst (see Figure 2a) we consider a change in 4), the capital
adjustment parameter, from the estimated value of .57 to alternative values of .7
and .4. It is clear from equation (15) that a change in i^ affects not only the level
of carryover of capital stock from one period to the next, but also the respon-
siveness of effort to price. A higher value of (t> indicates a more rapid response. At
high rates of adjustment, effort reacts quickly to low initial prices and exits,
allowing for early advertising. However, because effort responds more dramati-
cally to price increases as well, large amounts of advertising are not possible
because they draw in too much effort too quickly. Thus, changes in ^ cause both
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Figure 2a. Optimal advertising levels assuming different levels of effort adjustment {^).
1967 initial conditions of high effort and low stocks, low value of (|) cause adver-
tising to be postponed. However, once undertaken, greater amplitudes in the
cycle are optimal since effort is less responsive to price changes.
Figure 2b illustrates the effect of variations in the carryover in the stock of
goodwill. While there is a slight frequency difference among the three cycles, the
major difference is amplitude. Large rates of decay in goodwill (i.e, smaller values
of 8 and thus smaller carryovers) are associated with larger amplitudes. Here, high
decay rates prevent advertising from having a sustained effect on price, causing
pulsing to be more effective in increasing returns without drawing in effort. The
final steady-state level of advertising is higher with less carryover of goodwill
because the implicit costs of excessive effort are smaller. This suggests the rather
perverse result that for a common property resource, lower levels of advertising
when product identification through promotion lasts for a long time. This result is
especially interesting since it suggests that if the errors in equation (15) are serially
correlated and hence we are overvaluing, optimal strategies should be at even
higher levels and more intensively pulsed than we have prescribed.
The most dramatic effects occur when changes in the growth rate parameter
are introduced. Figure 2c illustrates how a change from our estimated 1.42 to 1.30
reduces the cyclic nature and level of advertising dramatically. Moreover, a rise
in the value to 1.52 causes optimal advertising to be immediately constrained by
the upper bound ($500,000) and to remain constrained throughout the time hori-
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Figure 2b. Optimal advertising levels assuming different levels of goodwill carryover (8).
costs so that excessive effort is not especially costly and advertising has greater
returns. It also suggests that returns to advertising can be enhanced by public
stock repletion programs which artificially raise r. Because of the large sensitivity
of the results to the value of r it is important to have an unbiased and precise
estimate of r prior to instituting any advertising program.
Conclusions and Implications
Our analysis demonstrates the potential for generic advertising to temporarily
increase producer returns in a competitive common property resource. By using
estimates from a dynamic bioeconomic model of the Maryland oyster industry, we
show that certain types of advertising paths result in producer profits, even with
a common property resource base. We emphasize that the profits are short-lived,
and that the system eventually tends toward a steady-state zero-profit equilib-
rium. The new steady-state differs from the no advertising scenario due to higher
prices and lower fish stocks. The profits obtained in the earlier time periods offset
the discounted losses to advertising in the later time periods when industry profits
are assumed to be zero and there is a positive advertising expenditure. Sub-
optimal advertising of the common property resource, for example, heavy adver-
tising when stocks are depleted and price is high, can actually lower industry
profits relative to the no advertising scenario.
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Figure 2c. Optimal advertising levels assuming different levels of population growth (r).
ened cycles over time. Although initial conditions are important in shaping the
pattern, the illustration indicates that the cycles allow the resource manager to
take advantage of slow response in capital adjustment and resource growth, while
moving toward the steady state. For the oyster case, delayed advertising allows
the stocks to build to a level where the advertising induced effect does not dras-
tically deplete the resource base. Sensitivity analysis indicates the amplitude,
phasing and period of the cycle are indeed sensitive to the rate of adjustment in
capita! stock and the growth rate of the resource. Variation in the carryover of
goodwill does not have a dramatic effect on the optimal time path for advertising.
Cyclical advertising offers a means of indirectly controlling effort, and as such
could offer managers an added regulatory tool. Some of the advantages of pulse
advertising may be lost, however, if fishermen are aware of advertising plans and
come to anticipate the rise in price which accompanies promotional campaigns by
adjusting their effort accordingly. In these cases, a rational expectations model
similar to the Berck and Perloff model might be desirable. Institutional and envi-
ronmental uncertainties are likely to discourage this behavior for many fisheries.
The policy prescriptions implied by our model derive from the politically re-
alistic objective of increased short run industry profits. As a result, it is not meant
to be an economically efficient strategy. Further gains might be made if effort, in
addition to advertising, could be explicitly controlled by a taxing or entry restric-
tion scheme. However, the likelihood of direct effort restrictions in most fisheriesPulsed Generic Advertising 207
is limited. Given the typically constrained decision environment, our analysis and
framework provide useful guidance to controlling advertising.
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